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1. Introduction 
Significant ethnic differences or lack of ethnic parity in employment rates have existed in Great 
Britain for several decades (Blackaby et al, 1999; 2002; Cabinet Office, 2003; Heath & Cheung, 
2006; Berthoud & Blekesaune, 2006; National Audit Office, 2008). The National Audit Office (2008) 
shows that over the last twenty years, the employment gap between Ethnic Minorities and Whites 
has fluctuated between 12.5 percentage points in 1989 and 20 percentage points in 1994. Since 
1994, however, the gap has fallen steadily such that by the third quarter of 2007 it stood at 13.2 
percentage points, with 74.8% of the White working-age population in Great Britain in employment 
compared with 61.6% of the equivalent Ethnic Minority population (Labour Force Survey). 
 
As might be expected, this overall gap conceals considerable diversity in employment rates across 
ethnic groups (Blackaby et al, 1997; Blackaby et al, 1999; Carmichael & Woods, 2000; Heath & 
Cheung, 2006; Clark & Drinkwater, 2007; 2008; National Audit Office, 2008). For example, Indian 
individuals have employment rates that are only slightly lower than those for White individuals, 
whereas Pakistani and Bangladeshi individuals have employment rates that are considerably 
lower: in 2007, only 47% of Pakistanis and 44% of Bangladeshis were in employment, compared to 
around 75% of Whites.2 There are also important differences in occupations across ethnic groups 
(Li and Heath, 2008). To our knowledge, however, there is no evidence available on the extent of 
ethnic parity in labour market outcomes amongst benefit claimants in Great Britain.  
 
These observed raw differences in labour market outcomes between Ethnic Minorities and Whites 
suggest that some Ethnic Minority groups may be facing significant obstacles to finding and 
keeping a job. In 2003, the UK government stated that ‘in ten years’ time, Ethnic Minority groups 
should no longer face disproportionate barriers to accessing and realising opportunities for 
achievement in the labour market’ (Cabinet Office, 2003). To achieve such aims, policymakers 
clearly need to be well-informed about the exact form and extent of any such barriers: in particular, 
they need to know whether ethnic differences in employment outcomes can be attributed to:  
 
a) differences in the characteristics of White and Ethnic Minority groups (which reduce the 
employability of some ethnic groups relative to Whites);  
b) some form of discriminatory behaviour in the labour market (either by employers or by Ethnic 
Minorities themselves); 
                                                
2 These figures are largely driven by very low rates of employment amongst women in these groups (of around 26% for 
Bangladeshis and 28% for Pakistanis) (National Audit Office, 2008). 
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c) (in the case of benefit claimants) differential effectiveness of public services designed to help 
individuals return to work.  
 
To be able to identify these effects, it is essential to compare each Ethnic Minority group with an 
otherwise-identical White group. Of course, it must be acknowledged that if there is differential 
selection into employment on the basis of unobservables and if there has been discrimination in 
the labour market in the past, then comparing observationally equivalent Ethnic Minorities and 
Whites benefit claimants may risk comparing more able Ethnic Minorities with less able Whites, 
which would lead to an underestimate of any ethnic penalty and an overestimate of any ethnic 
premium. This issue has been well documented in the literature on ethnic and gender wage gaps 
(see, for example, Neal & Johnson, 1996). However, from a policymaker’s perspective, it seems 
important to take some account of observable characteristics when trying to understand the 
potentially differential effectiveness of public services for White and Ethnic Minority benefit 
claimants, hence we proceed on this basis, acknowledging that we will not identify the extent of 
discrimination in the labour market, but will instead provide policymakers with better information 
than has hitherto been available on the labour market outcomes of benefit claimants in Great 
Britain.  
 
Most previous studies that have attempted to take account of potentially endogenous observable 
characteristics such as labour market history or educational attainment do so by using simple 
multivariate regression techniques, which rely on being able to observe all characteristics likely to 
be relevant in determining employment outcomes (e.g. Blackaby et al, 1999; Clark & Drinkwater, 
2007). In this literature, any unexplained (or residual) difference is then attributed to discrimination 
and the response of Minorities to discrimination (see for example Lindley, 2005).. However, it is 
now well known that simple regression techniques may be biased if: 
  
(i) there are ‘common support’ problems, that is, incomplete overlap in the range of values 
taken by the observed characteristics for the treatment group (in this case, Ethnic Minorities) 
and the comparison group (Whites);  
(ii) the distribution of characteristics greatly differs between the two groups over the common 
support, and;  
(iii) the effect of the treatment (the ethnic penalty/premium) varies according to observed 
individual characteristics.  
 
Given the differences in characteristics between Ethnic Minorities and Whites observed in most 
studies, this is likely to be particularly problematic when trying to identify the impact of ethnicity on 
any outcome of interest.  
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To our knowledge no study has examined how sensitive estimates of ethnic penalties or ethnic 
parity are to the quantitative method of estimation used. In this paper, we borrow heavily from the 
economic evaluation literature to address this issue. We argue that given our data and questions of 
interest, the most appropriate technique (that is, the one with the most tenable assumptions) is 
propensity score matching. Like OLS, it depends on observing all those key determinants of the 
outcomes of interest that differ between ethnic groups; however, we argue that the detailed labour 
market histories we are able to construct should substantially reduce biases due to characteristics 
that we do not observe. Matching also deals with a number of the shortcomings of OLS: it 
compares only comparable individuals, weighting them correctly and allowing the ethnic penalty to 
vary across individuals. We compare the results obtained from matching with those derived using 
three alternative approaches – OLS, fully interacted OLS and difference-in-differences, a method 
which allows for selection on unobservables under certain assumptions. 
 
The aims of this paper are therefore twofold: 1) to provide evidence on the extent to which there is 
ethnic parity in labour market outcomes amongst Ethnic Minority and White benefit claimants in 
Great Britain; 2) to provide evidence on the extent to which previous estimates of ethnic parity may 
have been biased as a result of relying on simple linear regression techniques.   
 
Using newly released administrative data on benefit claimants in Great Britain3, we find that it is 
often not possible to calculate reliable estimates of the extent of ethnic parity: Minorities and 
Whites are simply too different in terms of their observable characteristics to be satisfactorily 
compared. Moreover, in many cases, the different estimation techniques give wildly differing 
answers, both in terms of sign and of significance of the penalty. This casts doubts on the reliability 
of previous work that has relied on a single technique without any consideration of how 
comparable Whites and Ethnic Minorities actually are. Parametric methods such as OLS, or even 
fully interacted OLS, can easily hide from the analyst the fact that observationally different ethnic 
groups are de facto being compared on the basis of extrapolations based purely on the imposed 
functional form.  
 
There are two groups, however, for which we are consistently able to calculate reliable results: 
claimants of Incapacity Benefit (IB) and claimants of Income Support (IS). For these groups, we 
find that controlling for relevant labour market and demographic characteristics eliminates almost 
all ethnic penalties. In other words, the observed gap in labour market outcomes between 
                                                
3 We consider claimants of Jobseeker’s Allowance, Incapacity Benefit and Income Support, and participants in New Deal 
for Lone Parents, New Deal 25 Plus and New Deal for Young People. More details about our data and samples can be 
found in Sections 3 and 4. 
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Minorities and Whites’ claimants can be entirely explained by differences in characteristics. For 
these groups, there is also a good degree of consistency across methodologies. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines our methodology; Section 3 describes the data 
we use; Section 4 describes how we selected our samples; Sections 5 and 6 present our results; 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to determine the extent to which there is ethnic parity in the labour market 
outcomes of benefit claimants in Great Britain. A natural definition for ethnic parity is when there is 
no difference, on average, between the outcome for an Ethnic Minority claimant and the outcome 
for an ‘otherwise-identical’ White claimant. Where parity does not exist, there will be either an 
ethnic penalty – if Ethnic Minority customers experience worse outcomes than otherwise-identical 
White customers – or an ethnic premium – if Ethnic Minority customers experience more 
favourable outcomes than otherwise-identical White customers. This definition is an ideal one, and 
our aim is to approximate it empirically. 
 
Since Whites and Ethnic Minorities may differ in terms of characteristics other than ethnicity that 
affect labour market outcomes, the observed difference in outcomes is likely to provide a biased 
estimate of ethnic parity. To avoid such a bias, one needs to deal with any differences between 
ethnic groups in terms of characteristics that may affect their outcomes, such as the individual’s 
family background, education and labour market history. 
 
A number of techniques are available to control for observed differences in characteristics. Within 
this group of estimators, the technique which is most likely to provide reliable estimates of ethnic 
parity and which therefore represents the primary approach used in this paper is matching (see 
e.g. Imbens, 2004, for an extensive review). Matching re-weights Whites to look as similar as 
possible to Minorities in terms of observable factors that might affect labour market outcomes. The 
estimate of the ethnic penalty/parity/premium is then obtained by comparing the mean labour 
market outcome of the Ethnic Minority group with the mean outcome of the appropriately re-
weighted White comparison group. To ensure comparability, Ethnic Minority customers for whom 
no suitable White comparator can be found (i.e. those who fall outside the ‘common support’) are 
excluded from the analysis. 
 
Matching is more flexible than most of the alternative techniques available. It also provides a series 
of diagnostic tests that can be used to analyse how well White and Minority samples have been 
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matched. This is critically important, as when the White sample cannot be re-weighted 
satisfactorily, it is not clear that any method will provide unbiased estimates of ethnic parity. In this 
paper, we use a set of criteria to determine when a result should be considered reliable, in the 
sense that reasonably balanced samples have been achieved. These criteria are heuristic in 
nature and in line with the spirit of the different diagnostic tests used in the matching literature to 
ensure that the groups in question have become sufficiently well balanced (see, e.g., Blundell et al, 
2005). The criteria are: 
 
• Given the special importance attached in the literature to the pre-inflow history for the outcome 
of interest (for example, employment history for an estimate of employment parity) we require 
that it be successfully balanced at the 5 per cent level. 
• We then consider how many of roughly 120 pre-inflow characteristics still significantly differ 
between Whites and Minorities at the 5 per cent level after matching. 
• If a substantial number of these characteristics do remain individually unbalanced, we consider 
their joint importance in predicting whether an individual is of Ethnic Minority or White origin 
(this is done in terms of the pseudo-R2 of a probit on the observables run on the matched 
samples). 
• As a final indicator, we consider the median bias, which gives the median percentage distance 
between the matched groups in terms of observed characteristics (median across all matching 
variables).4 
 
Unlike matching, standard regression techniques (OLS) may produce biased estimates of ethnic 
parity because they: 
 
• may implicitly extrapolate across non-comparable individuals (the common support problem); 
• may not weight comparable individuals correctly; 
• typically assume that the ethnic penalty is constant across individuals. 
 
Since previous studies estimating ethnic parity have often relied upon simple regression methods, 
an important contribution of this paper is in assessing the reliability of such techniques by 
comparing the results they produce with those produced by matching. Of course, some of the 
restrictions imposed by OLS can be relaxed. In particular, a fully interacted OLS model (‘fully 
interacted linear matching’ – FILM) allows the ethnic penalty to vary according to each observable 
characteristic rather than constraining it to be constant. Indeed, previous research has shown that 
FILM can often produce estimates that are very similar to those obtained by matching (Blundell et 
                                                
4 In addition, we restrict our analyses to ethnic minority (sub)groups with at least 400 individuals. We also imposed 
requirements on the maximum share of the minority sample that can be lost to common support, but this did not prove 
binding for the results we present. 
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al, 2005). Nevertheless, the diagnostics provided by matching allow one to investigate the extent to 
which groups are truly comparable, which may be hidden in both simple and interacted OLS 
models. We investigate such issues empirically in Section 5. 
 
It should be noted, however, that both matching and regression techniques are only able to control 
for observed differences between Whites and Minorities, so their reliability crucially depends on the 
range and quality of observed characteristics. To the extent that unobserved differences are 
important for explaining labour market outcomes, these will show up in the ethnic parity estimates. 
Our choice of sampling frame (see Section 4) and the rich set of characteristics we control for are 
designed to minimise the extent to which unobservables are important. Previous literature has 
indicated the potential for detailed labour market histories (like those we construct) to eliminate 
much of the bias due to unobservables (see for example, Heckman and Smith, 1999, Heckman, 
Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998 and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). 
 
An alternative technique, conditional difference-in-differences (DiD), is in principle able to deal both 
with observed differences in characteristics and with unobserved differences that remain constant 
over time. This technique involves calculating the average change in outcomes over time for both 
Whites and Minorities after controlling for observed characteristics, and then taking the difference. 
We present some results that use conditional difference-in-differences implemented in a flexible 
regression framework (FILM)5 and compare these results with our preferred set of results. The 
reason for not using DiD as our preferred technique is that entitlement conditions for some of the 
benefits and programmes we consider require the individual to be in a given labour market status 
for a certain time prior to inflow, preventing a meaningful application of the technique.6 An empirical 
issue with DiD is how best to deal with multiple pre-inflow time periods. Since the literature to date 
has not provided any established solution, we use either a 12-month moving window to capture 
seasonal effects or an average over the 12-month period before inflow. We present results using 
the former approach, but it turns out to make little difference to the results. 
 
As discussed above, one important caveat of our study relates to previous (i.e. pre-inflow) 
discrimination. If there is differential selection into employment on the basis of unobservables and if 
there has been discrimination in the labour market in the past, then members of an Ethnic Minority 
group with the same employment history as their matched White counterparts might represent a 
higher ‘slice’ of the (unobserved) ability distribution amongst their ethnic group. As a result, any 
investigation risks comparing more able Ethnic Minorities with less able Whites, which would lead 
                                                
5 To implement this DiD in our panel data, we regressed the change in outcome on ethnic minority status and its 
interactions with all our observed characteristics, controlling linearly for these pre-inflow characteristics as well. We then 
averaged the conditional impacts over the distribution of the observed characteristics in the relevant ethnic minority 
population. 
6 For example, New Deal 25 plus (a programme designed to help individuals over the age of 25 into work) is compulsory 
for those who have been claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (unemployment benefit) for 18 of the previous 21 months. 
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to an underestimate of any ethnic penalty and to an overestimate of any ethnic premium. A similar 
argument can be made in terms of other observables one would like to control for, such as 
education. If the selection process into education differs between Ethnic Minorities and Whites, 
then comparing Ethnic Minority and White individuals with the same level of education might still 
leave some unobservable differences unaccounted for.7 As already stated, however, because we 
are primarily interested in better understanding differences between the labour market outcomes of 
Ethnic Minority and White individuals following a spell on benefits and a consequent intervention by 
the state – and not on the role of labour market discrimination per se – we feel that our approach is 
justified.  
   
3. Data 
Our strategy for estimating ethnic parity requires that we have information about labour market 
outcomes and that we control for all pre-inflow characteristics likely to affect these outcomes and to 
differ between ethnic groups. The key variables we control for across all benefits and programmes 
are: 
• Age 
• Gender 
• Month of inflow to relevant benefit or programme 
• Detailed employment and benefit history 
• Previous participation in voluntary employment programmes 
• Basic Skills attendance 
• Jobcentre Plus district 
• Residence in one of a group of 272 deprived wards 
• Education (proxy) 
• Housing tenure (proxy) 
• Travel-to-work-area unemployment rate 
 
We also control for a number of variables that are only available or relevant for a subset of the 
benefits and programmes. These include presence of a partner, number of children, and whether 
the individual has a disability or illness. 
 
Our main data source is the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), an administrative 
dataset of benefit and employment spells for all individuals who have been on a Department for 
                                                
7 The same issues arise in the classic case of testing for discrimination on the grounds of gender using a wage equation 
that controls for observed characteristics such as labour market experience and education. If selection into the labour 
market is non-random (for instance if it is the case that only the most able of women enter the labour market or indeed 
obtained higher levels of education), then men and women with the same observed experience and education will differ 
in terms of unobservables. As far as we are aware, this issue has not been fully addressed in the literature. 
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Work and Pensions (DWP) programme or benefit since June 1999. Our analysis thus covers 
individuals who are unemployed, unable to work due to disability or those on very low incomes 
(see Section 4 for more details). The extract of the data that we use contains spells up to early 
2005. Because the WPLS data is an administrative source, it contains the entire populations we 
are interested in. Compared to survey data, we thus avoid problems with sample attrition, are able 
to use much more detailed ethnic breakdowns and provide estimates with higher precision.  
 
We used the WPLS to construct labour market outcomes and histories. We consider two labour 
market outcomes, both assessed month-by-month: the probability of being in employment (E) and 
the probability of being on benefits (B).8 In any one month (30-day period), individuals are defined 
as being employed (on benefits) if they are employed (on benefit) for at least half of the month.9 
Defining outcomes in this way explicitly takes account of the sustainability of any benefit exit or job 
entry and is therefore preferable to a measure that only considers first destination. Both benefit and 
employment outcomes are analysed to capture the extent to which individuals who are not 
employed remain on benefits and the extent to which individuals who are employed still collect 
benefits (in particular, Income Support). Individuals are followed and their outcomes measured for 
12 months following inflow.  
 
We constructed three years’ worth of labour market history, including month-by-month employment 
and benefit status for the six months prior to inflow, as well as variables describing the proportion 
of time employed and the proportion spent on benefits over the two-and-a-half years prior to that. 
We also used the WPLS to create indicators of past participation in voluntary employment 
programmes (as a crude indicator of willingness to improve one’s circumstances) and past 
participation in Basic Skills (a programme designed to address basic literacy, numeracy and IT 
skills). 
 
The WPLS also contains a limited number of background characteristics: ethnicity, date of birth, 
gender and postcode (that we used to identify Jobcentre Plus district and residence in one of a 
group of 272 deprived wards). 
 
Information from the WPLS was supplemented with information from other administrative sources, 
namely the National Benefits Database (NBD) and New Deal administrative datasets. The 
information available varies across benefits and programmes, but includes number of children, 
presence of a partner, and indicators of disability or illness. None of these sources contained 
                                                
8 The benefits included in this definition are IB, IS, Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), compensation whilst on a New Deal 
option, Basic Skills and Work-Based Learning for Adults. See Crawford et al (2008) for more details. 
9 We experimented with other definitions, but because most individuals are employed (or on benefit) either for all of the 
month or none of it, using an alternative threshold makes little difference to the results. 
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reliable information on education or wealth. Since both are likely to be important determinants of 
labour market outcomes, we created proxies using local-area data from the 2001 Census.10 We 
also used the Census to provide information about local labour market conditions (specifically, 
travel-to-work area unemployment rates). 
 
Before moving on to describe our sample definitions, there are some limitations of the WPLS that 
we must note. First, there is no record of how long individuals have been living in the UK. In 
comparing Ethnic Minorities and Whites, immigration may be an issue. An individual who has just 
arrived in the UK and starts claiming benefits or joins a programme will never previously have 
appeared in the WPLS (i.e. they will be recorded as never having previously been employed or on 
benefit), whereas they may, in reality, have been employed or on benefit in another country.  
 
We have tried to minimise the problems this causes by using the time that each individual has 
been observed in the WPLS as the reference for calculating pre-inflow labour market histories and 
by controlling for whether labour market status is known or unknown. Still, the underlying 
assumption remains that what Ethnic Minority individuals do when not in the WPLS is, on average, 
equivalent (at least in terms of labour market performance) to what their observationally similar 
White counterparts do when not in the WPLS. 
 
A related problem is that recent migrants to the UK may not speak English very well and are 
therefore likely to find it much harder to get a job than natives. At the same time, finding 
appropriate White comparators for them is likely to be difficult. Where possible, information on 
basic skills (including language) needs was used to remove such individuals from the analysis; the 
fraction affected was small. 
 
A second limitation of the WPLS is that employment spells for individuals on low earnings may be 
missing. This is because the data are derived from employer income tax returns which are only 
compulsory for employees earning enough to be subject to income tax. Although some employers 
submit returns for all employees regardless of their earnings, this is not always the case. 
Therefore, individuals earning below the income tax threshold may appear to be unemployed 
when, in fact, they do have a job. This is problematic if it differs by ethnicity – which it might do if, 
say, Ethnic Minorities are more likely to work for small employers who are less likely to submit 
forms for employees below the income tax threshold. There is no way of telling how quantitatively 
important this issue may be. 
                                                
10 To proxy education, we used SOA-level information (around 750 households) on the education level of unemployed or 
inactive individuals to calculate (separately for whites and minorities) the proportion whose highest qualification was: no 
qualifications, level 1 qualifications, level 2 qualifications, level 3 qualifications, level 4 qualifications or higher, and 
unknown qualifications (six categories). For wealth, we used the proportion of each ethnic group living in council or other 
social-rented housing, measured at Ward level (around 2,500 households). 
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4. Groups of interest and sampling frame 
We consider six main benefits and programmes: 
 
• Incapacity benefit (IB): paid to individuals who are assessed as being incapable of work and 
who meet certain National Insurance contributions conditions. 
• Income support (IS): a benefit for individuals on low income; claimants are usually lone 
parents, sick or disabled, or carers. 
• Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA): a benefit paid to individuals of working age who are 
unemployed, or who work fewer than 16 hours per week and are looking for full-time work. 
• New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP): a voluntary programme whose aim is to encourage lone 
parents to improve their work prospects and help them into work. 
• New Deal for individuals aged 25 plus (ND25plus): a programme to help unemployed 
individuals aged 25 and over to find and keep a job. Participation is compulsory for 
individuals who have been claiming JSA for at least 18 of the previous 21 months. 
• New Deal for Young People (NDYP): similar to ND25plus except that it is targeted on 
individuals aged 18-24. Participation is compulsory for those who have been claiming JSA for 
at least six months. 
 
Individuals in receipt of these benefits or on these programmes are collectively advised by a 
publicly funded agency designed to help them back into work, known as “Jobcentre Plus”. We thus 
also present results for “Jobcentre Plus overall”, which combines individuals on these six benefits 
and programmes, together with a number of smaller programmes - New Deal for Disabled People 
(NDDP), New Deal for Musicians (NDfM), Basic Skills, Work-Based Learning for Adults (WBLA), 
Employment Zones (Ezones) and Ethnic Minority Outreach11 – to give an overall estimate of the 
extent of ethnic parity in the benefit system. 
 
For each of these groups, the sampling frame was all individuals who 
 
(i) started the relevant benefit or programme during 2003;12 
(ii) on the start date, belonged to the appropriate age range for the benefit or programme in 
question and were aged no more than 57; and 
(iii) did not have a basic skills language need. 
                                                
11 For more details about these programmes, see Crawford et al (2008). 
12 For our IS and IB samples, the requirement was to have attended a Work-Focused Interview (WFI) during 2003 and 
that this WFI took place no more than six months after the benefit start date. WFIs are interviews carried out by 
Jobcentre Plus advisors to provide claimants with information and guidance about returning to work. Our analysis 
focuses on individuals who have attended WFIs because they are more likely to have ethnicity recorded. 
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We thus focus on the inflow of individuals starting a relevant benefit or programme during 2003. 
Calendar year 2003 was chosen to allow for three years’ worth of labour market histories and one 
year of outcomes. 
 
Figure 1 shows the sampling frame diagrammatically. 
 
Figure 1 Individual A enters the programme in 2003 
 
5. Overall results 
Table 1 presents overall results for Jobcentre Plus and the six main benefits and programmes. 
Alongside the raw differences, the table sets out estimates of ethnic parity constructed using four 
alternative methodologies – simple OLS, FILM (which allows the penalty to vary with observed 
characteristics), kernel matching (our preferred technique) and conditional difference-in-differences 
(implemented in a flexible regression framework and taking the difference for any given outcome 
month relative to 12 months previously). All results are for 12 months after inflow (i.e. the end of 
our outcome window). 
 
The Matching Quality column gives matching diagnostics, providing an indication of how 
successful re-weighting has been in making Whites look like Minorities across all observed 
dimensions. CS(x) indicates that x per cent of the Minority sample had to be dropped because it 
was not possible to find comparable Whites with whom they could be matched (i.e. it indicates the 
extent of the common support problem). UC(y) means that y covariates remained unbalanced after 
matching. UH(E,B) indicates that employment and benefit histories remain unbalanced after 
matching. R2(r) is the pseudo-r2 from a probit (on matched samples) of Ethnic Minority group on 
the observables and MB(s) gives the median percentage distance between the matched groups in 
terms of observed characteristics. 
 
Apr 00 
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There are two key points to take from this table. First, given our heuristic criteria set out above, 
only the results for IB and IS can be considered reliable. For all other groups except ND25plus, 
labour market histories are not satisfactorily balanced, and for all other groups except NDLP, the 
pseudo r2 is above 10 per cent. In these cases, Whites and Minorities are simply too different to be 
reliably compared. Crawford et al (2008) show that reliability problems persist when results are 
calculated for subgroups defined by sex, ethnicity and region. 
 
Table 1 Overall results 
 Number of 
Minorities 
Outcome Raw OLS FILM Kernel 
matching 
DiD Matching quality 
210,360 Employment -0.089** -0.004** -0.011** 0.038** -0.022** Jobcentre 
Plus   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
CS(2)UC(94)UH(E,B)R2
(0.141)MB(3.2) 
  Benefit 0.059** 0.013** 0.021** -0.006 0.034**  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)  
5,660 Employment –0.070** 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008 IB 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
CS(0)UC(28)R2(0.017)
MB(0.9) 
  Benefit 0.064** 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.006  
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)  
8,560 Employment –0.028** 0.014** 0.017** 0.021** 0.022** IS 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
CS(0)UC(35)R2(0.019)
MB(1.2) 
  Benefit 0.019** –0.017** –0.019** –0.020** –0.042**  
   (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)  
159,500 Employment -0.090** -0.008** -0.015** 0.037** -0.025** JSA 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
CS(2)UC(104)UH(E,B)R
2(0.143)MB(2.9) 
  Benefit 0.076** 0.023** 0.030** -0.015** 0.041**  
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)  
11,040 Employment -0.038** -0.009 -0.006 0.000 -0.014* NDLP 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
CS(0)UC(46)UH(E,B)R2
(0.029)MB(1.5) 
  Benefit 0.080** 0.031** 0.027** 0.021** 0.022**  
   (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  
13,080 Employment -0.004 0.016** 0.014** 0.030** -0.007 ND25plus 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
CS(0)UC(47)R2(0.102)
MB(1.7) 
  Benefit -0.040** -0.023** -0.013* -0.021* -0.005  
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)  
26,960 Employment -0.030** 0.006 0.002 0.066** -0.025** NDYP 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) 
CS(1)UC(79)UH(B)R2(0
.223)MB(4.1) 
  Benefit -0.033** 0.008 0.023** 0.052** 0.027**  
   (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007)  
Notes: 
1. Two stars (**) and one star (*) indicate that the difference is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per cent level of significance 
respectively. 
2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. For kernel matching they are calculated using an analytical approximation that ignores 
the fact that the propensity score is estimated. Due to the very large sample sizes in administrative data, it was not computationally 
feasible to bootstrap standard errors. 
3. CS(x) means that x per cent of the Ethnic Minority sample was lost to common support. UC(y) means that y covariates remained 
unbalanced after matching. UH(E,B) indicates that employment and benefit histories remained unbalanced after matching 
4. Sample sizes have been rounded to the nearest 20. 
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Second, consistency across methods varies considerably. For four of the groups (IB, IS, NDLP and 
ND25plus), different methods give very similar results. The sign and significance of the estimates 
is usually the same and the point estimates are close (and substantially different to the raw 
estimates). The only exception is the difference-in-differences results for ND25plus. For the other 
three groups (Jobcentre Plus, JSA and NDYP), however, different techniques do not give the same 
answer. For example, for Jobcentre Plus, OLS, FILM and difference-in-differences all suggest 
employment and benefit penalties significant at the 1 per cent level, whereas matching indicates a 
significant 4 percentage point employment premium and insufficient evidence to reject the 
hypothesis of benefit parity. Likewise, for NDYP, kernel matching indicates a 6.6 percentage point 
employment premium and difference-in-differences a 2.5 percentage point employment penalty 
(both significant at the 1 per cent level). Parity in employment outcomes is not rejected by either 
OLS or FILM. For the benefit outcome, OLS does not reject parity, while the other three methods 
suggest significant employment penalties, though the size of the point estimate is much larger for 
matching than for FILM or DiD. 
 
From this table, it might be tempting to conclude that, when results seem reliable, all the different 
techniques give the same answer. Unfortunately, as Crawford et al (2008) show, this does not hold 
for all subgroups: there are cases where matching diagnostics suggest the result is reliable, but 
alternative methods give qualitatively different answers. This is somewhat surprising given earlier 
work suggesting that FILM often produces results that are very similar to those obtained by 
matching (Blundell et al, 2005). 
 
These findings raise important questions over the reliability of previous regression-based estimates 
of ethnic parity. When matching cannot construct a suitable comparison group, it seems unlikely 
that any of the other techniques we employ will provide unbiased estimates. Since matching avoids 
a number of biases associated with OLS, this serves as a warning against relying on simple 
regression techniques to estimate the extent of ethnic parity in labour market outcomes. Earlier 
work that fails to directly address the issue of actual comparability of ethnic groups may therefore 
be misleading. 
 
6. IB and IS results 
As Table 1 shows, not all results were deemed unreliable. In particular, there are satisfactory 
results for IB and IS. In this section, we present more detailed results for these two groups, 
including breakdowns by sex and ethnic group (see Crawford et al, 2008, for detailed results for 
the other benefits and programmes in Table 1). 
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First, however, it is worth taking a step back and considering the characteristics of the two 
samples. Table 2 below shows the ethnic breakdown. In total, there are 72,600 claimants in the IB 
sample and 86,700 in the IS sample (these figures exclude individuals whose ethnicity is missing – 
see notes to Table 2). This is considerably lower than the number of individuals claiming IS or IB 
during 2003 because we consider only those flowing onto benefit, not the existing stock. We also 
require claimants to have attended a Work Focused Interview. Whites make up 92.2 per cent of the 
IB sample, Blacks 2.4 per cent, and Asians 3.6 per cent. For IS, the ethnic breakdown is similar, 
though with a slightly higher fraction of Minorities (9.9 per cent). Most of the difference is due to a 
greater number of Black individuals, who make up 3.9 per cent of the IS sample. Although not 
shown in the table, there is very little difference in ethnic composition between males and females 
(females make up just under 40 per cent of the IB sample and just under 60 per cent of the IS 
sample). 
 
Table 2 Ethnic breakdown of IB and IS samples 
Ethnic subgroup IB IS 
 % Number % Number 
White 92.2 66,920 90.1 78,140 
     
Ethnic Minority 7.8 5,660 9.9 8,560 
 Black 2.4 1,760 3.9 3,360 
  Black Caribbean 1.1 800 1.8 1,520 
  Black African 1.0 720 1.6 1,420 
  Other Black 0.3 240 0.5 420 
 Asian 3.6 2,600 3.9 3,380 
  Indian 1.2 880 1.0 900 
  Pakistani 1.8 1,320 2.2 1,920 
  Bangladeshi 0.2 160 0.3 240 
  Other Asian 0.3 240 0.4 320 
 Other 1.8 1,300 2.1 1,820 
  Mixed 0.5 340 0.7 580 
  Chinese 0.1 80 0.1 100 
  Other Ethnic Group 1.2 900 1.3 1,160 
     
All groups 100.0 72,600 100.0 86,700 
Notes: 
1. Individuals of unknown ethnic origin have been excluded. 8.4 per cent of the IB sample and 7.7 per cent of the IS sample are of 
unknown ethnic origin. 
2. Sample sizes have been rounded to the nearest 20. 
 
Whites and Minorities in the two samples differ considerably in terms of a number of characteristics 
that are likely to be important for labour market outcomes. For our sample of IB claimants, Table 3 
shows mean values for some key characteristics. Ethnic Minorities are on average younger than 
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Whites and have more children; they are more likely to have exhibited a basic skills need and 
participated in a voluntary programme in the three years prior to inflow, to be claiming Income 
Support at WFI date (used as a proxy for low income) and to live in higher unemployment areas. In 
terms of labour market histories, Ethnic Minorities have, on average, spent a smaller proportion of 
the three years prior to inflow in employment and a larger proportion on benefits than Whites. 
There is also considerable variation within the Ethnic Minority sample. For example, Blacks on 
average spent a larger proportion of the three years prior to WFI date on benefits than Asians. 
Table 3  IB: mean characteristics of the sample by ethnicity 
 Difference relative to White 
 
All White 
Ethnic 
Minority 
Black Asian Mixed, Chinese 
and Other 
Female 0.391 0.389 0.002 -0.016 0.004 0.022 
Age at inflow 36.7 36.7 0.927** 1.642** 0.078 1.653** 
Number of kids at inflow 0.010 0.010 -0.006* 0.008** -0.020** 0.002 
Proportion of time employed, 
years 1–3 before inflow 
0.459 0.464 0.113** 0.096** 0.120** 0.120** 
Proportion of time on benefits, 
years 1–3 before inflow 
0.460 0.458 -0.106** -0.175** -0.049** -0.125** 
Participated in a voluntary 
programme before inflow 
0.057 0.057 -0.015** -0.035** 0.001 -0.021** 
On Income Support at inflow 0.560 0.558 -0.097** -0.154** -0.044** -0.128** 
Unemployment rate in travel-
to-work area 
0.054 0.054 -0.001** -0.002** 0.001** -0.001* 
Notes: 
1. Two stars (**) and one star (*) indicate that the difference is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per cent level of significance 
respectively. 
 
Table 4 IS: mean characteristics of the sample by ethnicity 
 Difference relative to White 
 
All White 
Ethnic 
Minority 
Black Asian Mixed, Chinese 
and Other 
Female 0.582 0.581 -0.017** -0.073** 0.014 0.030* 
Age at inflow 33.0 32.9 -0.559** 0.006 -1.422** 0.007 
Married/cohabiting 0.106 0.098 -0.053** 0.063** -0.184** -0.021** 
Disabled 0.252 0.246 -0.008 0.052** -0.044** -0.053** 
Number of kids at inflow 0.843 0.821 -0.218** -0.113** -0.455** 0.029 
Age of youngest child at inflow 5.209 5.221 0.050 0.032 0.011 0.156* 
Proportion of time employed, 
years 1–3 before inflow 
0.379 0.382 0.057** -0.017* 0.127** 0.065** 
Proportion of time on benefits, 
years 1–3 before inflow 
0.517 0.515 -0.056** -0.062** -0.039** -0.077** 
Participated in a voluntary 
programme prior to inflow 
0.114 0.118 0.003 -0.041** 0.046** 0.006 
Unemployment rate in travel-to-
work area 
0.054 0.054 -0.002** -0.003** -0.000 -0.001** 
Notes: see notes to Table 3 
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Table 4 presents the same figures for our sample of IS claimants. Ethnic Minorities as a whole are 
more likely than Whites to be female, older, married/cohabiting and disabled; they tend to have 
more children and live in higher unemployment areas. On average, they have also spent a smaller 
proportion of the three years prior to inflow in employment and a larger proportion on benefits. Like 
the IB sample, there is significant variation within the Ethnic Minority sample. For example, Asians 
were, on average, employed for a considerably smaller proportion of the three years prior to inflow 
than Blacks. 
 
These tables illustrate clearly that in order to be confident of any estimates of the extent of ethnic 
parity between Minorities and Whites, we must adequately account for differences in composition. 
They also suggest it may be important to consider different ethnic groups separately. 
 
Overall IS and IB results 
Figures 1 and 2 show raw employment and benefit status over time for our IB and IS samples 
respectively. Months are measured along the horizontal axis, from six months prior to inflow to 12 
months after (months -5 to 12). Inflow is indicated by the vertical line between months 0 and 1. The 
vertical axis is the proportion of individuals employed or on benefit. For both IB and IS, Whites are 
more likely to be employed and less likely to be on benefits at all points in time, but the gap 
narrows around the time of inflow and tends to be smaller for IS than IB. As expected, the 
proportion of individuals employed rises over time after inflow and the proportion on benefit falls, 
but the fall in receipt of benefit is faster than the rise in employment. Around 20 per cent of 
individuals appear to be employed at inflow.13 
 
                                                
13 There are a number of possible explanations for this. First, although individuals claiming IB should be incapable of 
work, this does not mean that they are not employed: for example, it may be the case that they are in a period of 
temporary absence from their job, but were not entitled to Statutory Sick Pay (and hence have started claiming IB). A 
second possible explanation relates to the fact that the figure refers not to the day of interview itself, but to employment 
over the next 30 days. It is therefore possible that nobody was working on the actual day of interview, but did work for at 
least 15 of the next 30 days. Other work using the WPLS, however, suggests that this does not fully explain the 
difference (see, for example, Brewer et al, 2008). Thirdly, it may reflect uncertainties over start and end dates in the 
employment data, or fraudulent benefit claims. It is not possible to quantify the relative importance of each of these 
explanations. 
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Figure 1 IB: raw labour market status over time 
 
Notes:  
1. The x-axis shows the six months before entry into the programme (x=–5 to 0) and the 12 months after (x=1 to 12). 
2. The y-axis shows the proportion of the sample employed or on benefit. 
Figure 2 IS: raw labour market status over time 
 
Notes: see notes to Figure 1 
 
 
Figures 3 to 6 show the raw and matched results for the employment and benefit outcomes of IS 
and IB claimants overall, all of which do reasonably well on our heuristic reliability criteria 
described in Section 2. As before, months are along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis measures 
the percentage point difference between Minorities and Whites in the proportion employed/on 
benefit.14 A positive difference for employment (benefit) is described as an ethnic premium 
(penalty) and a negative difference as an ethnic penalty (premium). Large and small circles 
indicate that the difference is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 per cent 
level respectively. 
                                                
14 So, for example, the left-hand panel in Figure 3 shows the difference between the two lines in the left-hand panel of 
Figure 1.  
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The six months prior to inflow are included in the graphs to give an indication of matching quality: if 
Whites have been successfully rebalanced to look like Minorities, then the estimates will lie on the 
horizontal line at zero and there will be no circles indicating statistical significance. Obviously, this 
is not sufficient to meet all of the above reliability criteria, which also depend on how well all 
characteristics (not just previous employment and benefit history) have been balanced (Tables 5 
and 6 below provide all the necessary details). 
 
In all four cases, there is a large difference between raw and re-weighted outcomes. For IB, what 
was roughly a 7 percentage point employment penalty 12 months after inflow is completely 
eliminated by matching, so that ethnic parity cannot be rejected once observed characteristics 
have been taken into account. The IB benefit penalty is eliminated for all but a few months in the 
middle of the year and, at around 1 percentage point, these penalties are considerably smaller 
than the raw differences. For IS, raw employment and benefit penalties become premia of 2 
percentage points by the end of the 12-month outcome window, meaning that Minorities were 
significantly more likely to be in work and significantly less likely to be claiming benefits than 
comparable Whites. 
 
Figure 3 IB: ethnic parity in employment outcomes 
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Notes:  
1. The x-axis shows the six months before entry into the programme (x=–5 to 0) and the 12 months after (x=1 to 12). 
2. The y-axis shows the difference between Ethnic Minorities and Whites in the proportion employed or on benefit. 
3. The vertical line shows the time that individuals start claiming the benefit. 
4. Two stars (**) and one star (*), and large and small circles, indicate that the difference is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per 
cent levels respectively. 
 
Figure 4 IB: ethnic parity in benefit outcomes 
 
Notes: see notes to Figure 3 
 
Figure 5 IS: ethnic parity in employment outcomes 
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Notes: see notes to Figure 3 
 
Figure 6 IS: ethnic parity in benefit outcomes 
 
Notes: see notes to Figure 3 
 
Results by ethnic group 
For comparative purposes, the top lines of Tables 5 and 6 set out the overall results, with the 
remainder of the Table providing estimates for different ethnic groups, further broken down by 
gender (note that the ethnic subgroups are not all mutually exclusive). Due to insufficient sample 
sizes, analyses have not been performed for all subgroups (half of the ethnicity-sex combinations 
for IB and just under a third for IS contained fewer than the required 400 Minorities). As in Table 1, 
the figures in the Raw and Matched columns relate to month 12 (the end of the outflow window) 
and the Matching Quality column provides an indication of how well matching has performed in 
balancing the observed characteristics of Ethnic Minority and White claimants. 
 
Table 5 IB: estimates of ethnic parity for different ethnic groups 
Employment (Month 12) Benefit (Month 12) Matching quality Ethnic Group Sex N 
Raw Matched Raw Matched  
All M+F 5660 -0.070** 0.006 0.064** 0.007 
   (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
CS(0)UC(28)R2(0.017)MB(0.9) 
 M 3480 -0.058** 0.019* 0.063** 0.003 
   (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
CS(0)UC(19)R2(0.018)MB(1.1) 
 F 2200 -0.090** -0.013 0.065** 0.012 
   (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
CS(0)UC(0)R2(0.020) MB(1.5) 
Black M+F 1760 -0.054** 0.027 0.128** 0.023 
   (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) 
CS(2)UC(23)R2(0.105)MB(3.0) 
 M 1040 -0.066** 0.027 0.139** 0.025 
   (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) 
CS(1)UC(12)R2(0.088)MB(2.6) 
 F 720 -0.037* 0.028 0.111** 0.014 
   (0.017) (0.028) (0.015) (0.026) 
CS(16)UC(9)R2(0.093)MB(3.1) 
Black Caribbean M+F 800 -0.062** 0.008 0.152** 0.046* CS(5)UC(12)R2(0.085)MB(2.3) 
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   (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.020)  
 M 500 -0.085** 0.010 0.166** 0.045* 
   (0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) 
CS(4)UC(0)R2(0.075) MB(2.7) 
Black African M+F 720 -0.044** 0.029 0.116** 0.008 
   (0.016) (0.035) (0.015) (0.035) 
CS(5)UC(13)R2(0.143)MB(5.6) 
 M 400 -0.034 0.006 0.116** 0.005 
   (0.022) (0.039) (0.020) (0.039) 
CS(2)UC(6)R2(0.111) MB(5.2) 
Asian M+F 2600 -0.080** 0.013 0.012 -0.022 
   (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) 
CS(1)UC(17)UH(B) MB(2.8) 
 M 1600 -0.052** 0.028 0.006 -0.032 
   (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.020) 
CS(1)UC(6)R2(0.066) MB(2.4) 
 F 1000 -0.124** -0.034 0.022 0.001 
   (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.022) 
CS(3)UC(7)R2(0.071) MB(3.3) 
Indian M+F 880 -0.044** 0.024 0.002 -0.013 
   (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.024) 
CS(1)UC(5)R2(0.070) MB(3.6) 
 M 480 -0.011 0.067* 0.005 -0.002 
   (0.021) (0.032) (0.022) (0.033) 
CS(2)UC(0)R2(0.073) MB(4.2) 
 F 420 -0.089** -0.022 -0.006 -0.012 
   (0.021) (0.033) (0.023) (0.033) 
CS(5)UC(0)R2(0.072) MB(3.6) 
Pakistani M+F 1320 -0.107** -0.019 0.020 -0.004 
   (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021) 
CS(4)UC(9)R2(0.075) MB(3.4) 
 M 860 -0.087** -0.019 0.014 -0.015 
   (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) (0.027) 
CS(4)UC(4)R2(0.066) MB(4.0) 
 F 460 -0.139** -0.023 0.035 0.006 
   (0.018) (0.030) (0.021) (0.031) 
CS(8)UC(0)R2(0.074) MB(3.5) 
Mixed, Chinese & Other M+F 1300 -0.073** 0.007 0.081** 0.020 
   (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
CS(1)UC(9)R2(0.055) MB(1.8) 
 M 820 -0.058** 0.021 0.077** 0.006 
   (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) 
CS(3)UC(0)R2(0.058) MB(2.1) 
 F 480 -0.097** 0.002 0.089** 0.039 
   (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.025) 
CS(0)UC(0)R2(0.063) MB(2.5) 
Other M+F 900 -0.089** -0.001 0.083** 0.021 
   (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) 
CS(2)UC(3)R2(0.065) MB(2.6) 
 M 600 -0.067** 0.021 0.076** 0.004 
   (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) 
CS(3)UC(0)R2(0.061) MB(2.9) 
Notes: 
1. Three stars two stars (**) and one star (*) indicate that the difference statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per cent level of 
significance respectively. 
2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. These are calculated using an analytical approximation that ignores the fact that the 
propensity score is estimated. It was not computationally feasible to bootstrap standard errors. 
3. CS(x) means that x per cent of the Ethnic Minority sample was lost to common support. UC(y) means that y covariates remained 
unbalanced after matching. UH(B,E) indicates that benefit and employment histories remained unbalanced after matching 
4. Sample sizes have been rounded to the nearest 20. 
5. Ethnic groups are not mutually exclusive. For example, Black Caribbean is a subset of Black, and Other is a subset of Mixed, 
Chinese and Other. 
 
For both IB and IS, all results seem reliable, perhaps with the exception of Black and Black African 
groups. Almost all groups exhibit significant raw employment penalties: for example, the raw 
results suggest that Blacks overall are 5.4 percentage points less likely to be in employment 12 
months after inflow than Whites, while individuals of Mixed, Chinese and Other (MCO) ethnic origin 
are 7.3 percentage points less likely to be in work. The only two groups without significant 
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employment penalties are Black African males and Indian males. Among Black ethnic groups, raw 
penalties are generally larger for men than women, while the reverse is true for other ethnic 
groups. For benefits, there are significant raw penalties for Black and MCO groups (12.8 
percentage points for Blacks overall and 8.1 percentage points for MCO overall), and for Black 
groups, this penalty is generally much larger than the raw employment penalty. For Asian groups, 
in contrast, there is no significant raw benefit penalty, despite their having a significant employment 
penalty. 
 
Matching away observable differences between Minorities and Whites again eliminates almost all 
the penalties, for both employment and benefit outcomes. Black Caribbeans are the only 
exception, with around a 4.5 percentage point benefit penalty both overall and among the male 
subgroup. It is interesting to note, however, that these were the groups who displayed the largest 
differences in raw benefit collection rates (15.2 and 16.6 per cent respectively); contrasting them to 
comparable White claimants has thus decreased the observed penalty by well over two thirds. On 
the other hand, two groups experience significant employment premia: males overall and Indian 
males. This suggests that Ethnic Minority males (Indian males) are 1.9 percentage points (6.7 
percentage points) more likely to be in work than comparable White males 12 months after inflow.  
 
Results are similar for IS, though less uniform. The raw employment penalties observed for the 
overall group of claimants are driven by the Asian groups and, to a lesser extent, the Mixed, 
Chinese and Other groups. Indeed, Black groups display either no raw employment penalties 
(males) or a premium (females). The overall premia of 4.1 percentage points for Blacks, 5.9 
percentage points for Black Caribbeans and 2.6 percentage points for Black Africans are in fact 
driven by the corresponding female subgroups. As was the case with IB, raw employment 
outcomes tend to be worse for men than for women amongst Black groups, while the reverse is 
true for other ethnic groups. 
 
Table 6 IS: estimates of ethnic parity for different ethnic groups 
Employment (Month 12) Benefit (Month 12) Matching quality Ethnic Group Sex N 
Raw Matched Raw Matched  
All M+F 8560 -0.028** 0.021** 0.019** -0.020** 
   (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
CS(0)UC(35)R2(0.019)MB(1.2) 
 M 3440 -0.022** 0.024* 0.024** -0.008 
   (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) 
CS(0)UC(22)R2(0.019)MB(1.1) 
 F 5120 -0.035** 0.020* 0.016* -0.028** 
   (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
CS(0)UC(29)R2(0.023)MB(1.6) 
Black M+F 3360 0.041** 0.059** 0.053** -0.018 
   (0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.019) 
CS(1)UC(34)UH(B) 
R2(0.117)MB(3.0) 
 M 1160 -0.018 0.040* 0.085** 0.008 
   (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) 
CS(5)UC(9)R2(0.076) MB(2.1) 
 F 2200 0.063** 0.051 0.041** -0.025 
   (0.011) (0.029) (0.009) (0.028) 
CS(1)UC(27)R2(0.141)MB(3.9) 
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Black Caribbean M+F 1520 0.059** 0.054** 0.042** -0.022 
   (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) 
CS(9)UC(15)UH(B) 
R2(0.090)MB(3.5) 
 M 540 -0.030 0.040 0.099** 0.020 
   (0.017) (0.024) (0.015) (0.023) 
CS(5)UC(0)R2(0.078) MB(2.3) 
 F 980 0.100** 0.047 0.015 -0.042 
   (0.016) (0.034) (0.014) (0.033) 
CS(7)UC(12)R2(0.103)MB(5.2) 
Black African M+F 1420 0.026* 0.056 0.068** -0.014 
   (0.012) (0.034) (0.011) (0.033) 
CS(2)UC(19)R2(0.142)MB(4.8) 
 M 460 0.002 0.038 0.076** 0.011 
   (0.019) (0.032) (0.017) (0.031) 
CS(4)UC(6)R2(0.116) MB(4.5) 
 F 960 0.026 0.070 0.069** -0.011 
   (0.015) (0.042) (0.013) (0.040) 
CS(1)UC(14)R2(0.153)MB(5.5) 
Other Black M+F 420 0.026 0.041 0.046* 0.010 
   (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) 
CS(1)UC(0)R2(0.102) MB(3.9) 
Asian M+F 3380 -0.089** 0.010 -0.028** -0.055** 
   (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) 
CS(1)UC(22)R2(0.073)MB(2.3) 
 M 1460 -0.024* 0.031 -0.022 -0.010 
   (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) (0.024) 
CS(2)UC(10)R2(0.072)MB(3.3) 
 F 1920 -0.137** -0.020 -0.034** -0.073** 
   (0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) 
CS(3)UC(16)R2(0.074)MB(2.1) 
Indian M+F 900 -0.036* 0.034 -0.028 -0.060* 
   (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) (0.025) 
CS(2)UC(13)R2(0.081)MB(2.7) 
 F 520 -0.059** 0.004 -0.024 -0.061* 
   (0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.027) 
CS(7)UC(0)R2(0.068) MB(3.3) 
Pakistani M+F 1920 -0.116** -0.012 -0.031** -0.026 
   (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) (0.021) 
CS(4)UC(13)R2(0.076)MB(3.1) 
 M 840 -0.053** -0.004 -0.014 -0.014 
   (0.013) (0.029) (0.015) (0.031) 
CS(6)UC(4)R2(0.070) MB(3.6) 
 F 1100 -0.162** -0.049 -0.045** -0.024 
   (0.011) (0.029) (0.014) (0.030) 
CS(3)UC(4)R2(0.086) MB(3.6) 
Mixed, Chinese & Other M+F 1820 -0.043** 0.013 0.043** -0.003 
   (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
CS(1)UC(11)R2(0.049)MB(1.5) 
 M 820 -0.024 0.033 0.021 -0.024 
   (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
CS(1)UC(6)R2(0.061) MB(2.4) 
 F 1000 -0.053** -0.005 0.059** 0.011 
   (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) 
CS(1)UC(0)R2(0.046) MB(1.9) 
Mixed M+F 580 0.003 0.012 0.039* 0.021 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
CS(0)UC(0)R2(0.077) MB(2.9) 
Other M+F 1160 -0.070** 0.006 0.050** -0.012 
   (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
CS(1)UC(5)R2(0.059) MB(2.0) 
 M 580 -0.026 0.049* 0.028 -0.026 
   (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) 
CS(1)UC(0)R2(0.061) MB(2.8) 
 F 580 -0.099** -0.023 0.066** -0.003 
   (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) 
CS(2)UC(0)R2(0.055) MB(1.9) 
Notes: see notes to Table 5 
 
In terms of benefit receipt, there are raw penalties for Black and Mixed, Chinese and Other groups. 
For Asians, there are no raw penalties and a few raw premia (i.e. the raw results suggest that IS 
claimants of Asian ethnic origin are less likely to be employed but also less likely to be on benefits 
than White claimants). 
 
Comparing Ethnic Minority claimants with comparable Whites eliminates all the raw penalties – 
both in terms of benefit and employment outcomes – and reveals premia for some groups. In terms 
of employment, for example, there is a premium of 5.9 percentage points for Blacks overall and of 
5.4 percentage points for Black Caribbeans overall (almost three times larger than the 2.1 
percentage point premium across all ethnic groups). In terms of benefit receipt, the premia are 
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concentrated among Asian groups: Asians overall are 5.5 percentage points less likely to be 
claiming benefits than comparable Whites 12 months after inflow, while Indians overall are 6.0 
percentage points less likely to be claiming benefits. 
 
In short, the results for IB and IS indicate that differences in characteristics explain almost all of the 
observed raw employment and benefit penalties, such that most ethnic groups are found to be at 
least as likely to be in work and off benefits 12 months after inflow as comparable White benefit 
claimants. This finding is in marked contrast to previous studies which have sought to estimate the 
ethnic (un)employment gap, in which significant penalties have been found, even after controlling 
for a range of observable characteristics. Of course, this may be because we are focusing on 
benefit recipients rather than considering the whole working age population. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used novel administrative data to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
labour market outcomes of Ethnic Minority and White benefit recipients in Great Britain. In general, 
there are large and significant raw differences, with Ethnic Minorities 8.9 percentage points less 
likely to be in work and 5.9 percentage points more likely to be on benefit than Whites 12 months 
after starting a benefit claim. 
 
From a policy perspective, it is important to know whether this gap is due to: a) differences in the 
characteristics of Ethnic Minority and White groups; or b) some form of discriminatory behaviour in 
the labour market (either by employers or by Ethnic Minorities themselves, who may, for example, 
choose not to apply for a job because they believe – rightly or wrongly – that they will be 
discriminated against), or differential effectiveness of services designed to help individuals return to 
work. 
 
While previous work in this area has tended to use simple regression methods to estimate these 
effects, we consider a range of different techniques, of which our preferred method is kernel-based 
propensity score matching. We carried out our analysis on the claimants of three benefits (IS, IB 
and JSA) and the participants of three programmes (NDLP, NDYP and ND25plus). However, 
satisfactory results – that is based on an appropriate comparison group - could be calculated only 
for claimants of Incapacity Benefit and Income Support. For these two groups we found that large 
and significant raw penalties disappeared once we controlled for background and labour market 
characteristics. In other words, the gap in labour market outcomes following a spell on benefits can 
be entirely explained by differences in pre-programme characteristics and local labour market 
conditions. Black Caribbeans on IB are the only group for which penalties, though largely reduced 
in size, persist after matching. For males and females together, the penalty is 4.6 percentage 
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points. For IS, premia are more widespread, being found for Ethnic Minorities overall, as well as for 
the employment outcomes of Black claimants and the benefit outcomes of Asian claimants. 
 
One important caveat worth reiterating is that in the presence of past labour market discrimination 
against Ethnic Minorities coupled with differential selection into employment based on 
unobservables, members of an Ethnic Minority benefit group with the same employment history as 
their matched White counterparts are likely to be of higher average unobserved ability. This would 
lead to an underestimate of any ethnic penalty and to an overestimate of any ethnic premium. 
Moreover, the analysis in this paper does not allow one to disentangle which of the various 
potential channels (described above) lead Ethnic Minority benefit claimants to experience different 
outcomes from observationally similar Whites. These effects are conflated in our estimates of 
ethnic parity. 
 
The most important conclusion of this paper, however, is that for many groups it is simply not 
possible to calculate reliable quantitative estimates of the extent of ethnic parity in labour market 
outcomes for benefit claimants using existing administrative data combined with local 
neighbourhood information. Whites and Minorities accessing Jobcentre Plus programmes and 
services are often too different in terms of pre-programme characteristics for this question to be 
answered. This will pose a problem regardless of the estimation method used: indeed, our analysis 
has shown that, for some programmes, the estimates of ethnic parity differ in sign and significance 
depending on the quantitative approach taken. These issues raise serious questions about the 
reliability of previous work that has used simple regression methods without carefully considering 
whether the assumptions required to produce unbiased estimates have been satisfied.  
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